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Israel-Jordan: Foreign Minister Eban still believes there is a slim possibility Jordan will agree to negotiate. (Page 4)

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[ISRAEL-JORDAN: ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN STILL BELIEVES THERE IS A SLIM POSSIBILITY THAT JORDAN WILL AGREE TO NEGOTIATE INDIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL, DESPITE EGYPT'S FIRM OPPOSITION TO SUCH A STEP.

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IN CONVEYING EBAN'S VIEWS TO US REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK, ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TEKOAHA ADDED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER BASES THE POSSIBILITY, "ALTHOUGH NOT THE PROBABILITY," THAT HUSAYN WILL DECIDE TO MOVE INDEPENDENTLY ON THE ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE AND ON ALLEGED PRESSURE JORDANIAN PALESTINIAN LEADERS HAVE EXERTED ON THE KING TO MOVE TOWARD SOME UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL.

EBAN'S HOPES SEEM HIGHLY UNREALISTIC. ALTHOUGH CERTAIN PALESTINIAN LEADERS HAVE DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF AN ACCOMMODATION, THE POLITICAL RISKS OF ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTING A DECISION TO TREAT WITH ISRAEL, EVEN INDIRECTLY, ARE LIKELY TO DETER HUSAYN FROM TAKING THIS ROAD.

UNSTATED IN THESE ACCOUNTS OF ISRAELI VIEWS AND PLANS IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT WITHIN ISRAEL'S GOVERNMENT TIME IS RUNNING OUT ON EBAN AND OTHER MODERATES WHO FAVOR A PERSISTENT QUEST FOR SOME FORM OF DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT WITH THE ARABS. THE ISRAELI "HAWKS," LED BY DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE DAYAN, HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY RESTIVE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY MOVEMENT ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT. THEY ARGUE THAT THE ARABS ONLY UNDERSTAND FORCE, AND THAT THE ONLY REAL ISSUE IS WHAT MILITARY TACTICS ARE LIKELY TO INTIMIDATE THEM MOST EFFECTIVELY.

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